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Understanding the evolution and state of democracy in Zimbabwe: When a coup is not called a coup

July
14,
2025


  • This
    report
    assesses
    the
    current
    state
    of
    democracy
    in
    Zimbabwe
    and
    the
    multiple
    factors
    shaping
    its
    evolution
    in
    the
    last
    decade.
  • The
    authors
    argue
    that,
    most
    recently,
    the
    2017
    ousting
    of
    President
    Mugabe
    by
    military
    coup
    was
    a
    move
    which
    set
    the
    country
    on
    a
    path
    back
    toward
    authoritarianism.
  • In
    particular,
    the
    authors
    attest
    that
    Western
    hesitance
    to
    acknowledge
    the
    coup
    enabled
    the
    ZANU
    PF
    party
    to
    evade
    international
    condemnation
    and
    stage
    a
    problematic
    election,
    granting
    the
    government
    a
    veneer
    of
    legitimacy.


Since
gaining
independence
from
colonial
rule
in
1980,
democracy
has
struggled
to
take
root
in
Zimbabwe.
The
country
provides
an
excellent
example
of
what
Charles
Tilly
(2017)
described
as
the
process
of
democratization
and
de-democratization,
wherein
countries
chase
democracy
without
success,
sometimes
getting
better
and
at
other
times
experiencing
erosion,
backsliding,
and
regression.
Zimbabwe’s
current
political
situation
is
best
described
as
an
illiberal,
militarized,
electoral
authoritarian
regime
(Masunungure
,
2011;
Levitsky
and
Way,
2002;
LeBas
and
Munemo,
2019).
On
paper,
Zimbabwean
institutions
allow
the
basic
tenets
of
democracy:
regular
elections,
participation
by
the
opposition,
civil
society,
and
a
broad
bill
of
rights.
Yet
elections
are
a
façade
covering
a
deeply
entrenched
authoritarian
system.
The
opposition
has
been
decimated
by
violence,
intimidation,
infiltration,
unlawful
arrests,
co-option,
and
delegitimization
as
“stooges”
of
Western
states.
Civil
society
operates
with
a
lot
of
courage
under
close
state
surveillance
and
instruments
such
as
the
Private
Voluntary
Organizations
(PVO)
Act
give
the
government
wide-ranging
powers
to
control
and
surveil
the
activities
of
voluntary
organizations
(Ntini,
2022).
Additionally,
the
country’s
security
sector
has
a
strong
presence
in
politics
and
culture
(Ruhanya
and
Gumbo,
2023a;
Dorman,
2017;
Makumbe,
1998). 


Methodologically,
this
case
study
mainly
relies
on
original
qualitative
interviews
with
key
diplomats
and
politicians
involved
in
external
responses
to
Zimbabwe’s
2017
coup,
in
addition
to
using
primary
and
secondary
materials.
The
case
study
assesses
the
current
state
of
democracy
in
Zimbabwe
and
the
multiple
factors
shaping
its
evolution
in
the
last
decade.
The
data
for
this
paper
is
drawn
from
interviews
conducted
by
the
authors
for
this
project
and
past
projects,
where
relevant.
In
2013,
the
various
measures
of
accountability—vertical,
horizontal,
and
diagonal—were
stronger
than
they
had
been
since
the
early
2000s.
Following
the
violent
June
2008
runoff
presidential
election,
which
resulted
in
the
deaths
of 
hundreds
of
opposition
supporters,
a
new
Government
of
National
Unity
(GNU)
was
formed
as
a
proposed
end
to
the
conflict,
with
the
ruling 
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union
Patriotic
Front’s 
(ZANU
PF)
Robert
Mugabe
as
President
and
main
opposition
leader
Morgan
Tsvangirai
as
Prime
Minister
(Alexander
and
Tendi,
2008;
Badza,
2008;
McGreal,
2008).
Between
2009
and
2016,
the
country
seemed
to
be
moving
toward
political
stability
as
an
opening
for
democracy
emerged
due
to
the
2013
adoption
of
a
new
constitution,
a
lack
of
coups,
increased
economic
stability,
and
a
reduction
in
political
persecution
(Mahonye
and
Mandishara,
2015;
Richardson,
2013;
Musarurwa,
2016;
Dendere,
2019).


However,
in
2017,
President
Mugabe
was
ousted
in
a
military
coup
after
37
years
in
power
(Moore,
2018).
This,
we
argue,
reversed
the
strengthening
of
vertical,
horizontal,
and
diagonal
accountability
seen
in
preceding
years
and
set
Zimbabwe
on
a
path
back
toward
authoritarianism.
Indeed,
one
of
the
core
reasons
for
the
lack
of
democratization
in
Zimbabwe
is
the
political
role
of
the
military
(and
the
security
sector
more
broadly),
which
is
aligned
with
ZANU
PF
and
work
to
sustain
an
authoritarian
system.
Yet
the
2017
military
coup
found
initial
“acceptance”
or
“tolerance”
by
international
actors,
with
ZANU
PF
being
asked
to
deliver
a
reasonably
credible
post-coup
election
in
2018
as
a
key
step
towards
legitimate
government
and
the
resumption
of
international
economic
aid
for
Zimbabwe
(Reuters
2017;
Beavers,
2017).
However,
by
emphasizing
credible
elections,
international
actors
downplayed
the
urgent
need
for
reform
of
the
politically
entrenched
military
that
had
staged
the
coup,
and
which
was
the
foundation
for
the
country’s
authoritarian
system.
Consequently,
since
the
coup
and
subsequent
2018
election
there
has
been
more
authoritarian
continuity
than
democratic
change
in
Zimbabwe.
We
argue
that
the
current
government’s
hold
onto
power
was
further
strengthened
by
a
longstanding
pattern
of
mass
emigration
caused
by
weakening
accountability
and
political
persecution
and
that
the
government
worsened
a
deep
socioeconomic
crisis
since
the
coup.
Additionally,
a
weak
opposition
and
repression
towards
civil
society
have
significantly
contributed
to
ZANU
PF’s
ability
to
retain
power
and
extend
its
authoritarian
political
system
since
2017. 

Studies
of
Zimbabwean
politics
seldom
engage,
in
a
serious
way,
the
significant
role
of
democracy-promoting
Western
actors
in
sustaining
ZANU
PF’s
authoritarian
system.
Therefore,
in
this
paper,
we
analyze
how
Western
states
reacted
to
the
2017
military
coup
in
Zimbabwe
that
ousted
long-time
president
Mugabe
and
replaced
him
with
ZANU
PF
stalwart
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
We
argue
that
Western
states
chose
not
to
call
the
coup
a
coup
for
compound
reasons.
The
responses
of
Western
states
to
the
2017
coup
enabled
the
coup-makers
and
ZANU
PF
to
evade
international
condemnation
following
the
coup
and
stage
a
problematic
election
that
granted
the
coup-born
government
a
veneer
of
legitimacy.

The
paper
is
divided
into
four
sections.
The
first
section
is
a
historical
overview
of
Zimbabwean
politics
since
independence,
which
is
useful
background
for
the
reader
and
helps
us
appreciate
the
historically
rooted
nature
of
ZANU
PF’s
authoritarianism.
The
second
section
examines
how
domestic
factors
such
as
a
decline
in
civil
society
and
emigration
contribute
to
ZANU
PF’s
longevity
and
authoritarianism.
The
third
section
concerns
the
responses
of
Western
actors
to
Zimbabwe’s
2017
coup.
The
final
section
reflects
on
the
impact
of
the
2017
coup
and
its
subsequent
regime
on
the
current
state
of
Zimbabwean
politics.
We
now
turn
to
a
historical
overview
of
post-independence
Zimbabwe’s
politics.


Read
the
full
report.

Source:


Understanding
the
evolution
and
state
of
democracy
in
Zimbabwe:
When
a
coup
is
not
called
a
coup
|

Brookings

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published
in:

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