Congress,
way
back
when,
astutely
recognized
that
an
artist
entering
into
an
initial
contract
for
an
album,
song,
or
story
often
gets
the
bummest
of
bum
deals.
It
further
acknowledged
that
the
record
label
or
studio
or
other
corporate
demogorgon
on
the
other
side
of
that
initial
contract
often
benefits
excessively,
gobbling
up
the
creative
work
and
all
of
its
copyrights
and
making
most
of
the
money
when
that
work
becomes
a
success.
With
these
things
bouncing
around
in
its
hive
mind,
Congress
took
action,
building
Section
304
into
the
1909
Copyright
Act
and
Section
203
into
the
current
Act.
Both
sections
seek
to
remedy
the
grave
imbalance
in
bargaining
positions
between
budding
artists
and
corporate
monoliths
by
ensuring
that
artists
get
a
second
chance,
contractually
speaking,
to
see
the
fruits
of
their
artistic
labor.
Section
203,
the
modern
statute,
states
that
35
years
after
that
initial
transfer,
at
which
point
the
record
label
has
drunk
deeply
at
the
profit
trough,
the
artist
can
serve
a
written
notice
and
reclaim
the
copyrights
for
the
work,
at
which
point
he
or
she
can
seek
out
a
more
remunerative
and
fair
agreement.
And
Section
304
states
that
the
grant
may
be
terminated
at
any
time
during
a
period
of
five
years
beginning
at
the
end
of
56
years
from
the
date
copyright
was
originally
secured.
As
you
might
imagine,
these
provisions,
written
to
protect
and
empower
artists,
make
the
record
labels
furious,
and
those
labels
have
gone
all-out
to
frustrate
the
law’s
purpose.
We
can
fill
whole
columns
with
these
exploits,
but
let’s
concentrate
here
on
one
of
the
most
insidious:
the
averment
that
when
an
artist
reclaims
their
rights
under
Sections
203/304,
they
reclaim
only
their
rights
in
the
U.S.,
with
the
labels
keeping
their
claws
in
the
rest
of
the
rights
around
the
world.
Now,
this
argument
makes
little
sense
when
you
consider
that
when
an
artist
enters
into
that
initial
grant,
it
is
almost
always
a
global
grant,
assigning
rights
for
the
copyrighted
work
to
be
exploited
worldwide.
So
when
an
artist
terminates
that
grant,
the
artist
ipso
facto,
would
recover
those
very
same
global
rights.
This
result
is
cemented
by
the
notion
that
these
agreements
tend
to
be
entered
into
in
the
U.S.
between
U.S.
artists
and
U.S.
labels
and
cover
songs
created
in
the
U.S.
and
covered
by
U.S.
copyright
law.
But
the
labels,
undaunted,
claim
that
foreign
copyright
law,
in
large
part,
should
still
apply
to
limit
the
artist’s
reclamation
rights
as
they
pertain
to
global
transfer
agreements.
And
a
recent
appellate
decision
rejecting
that
argument
(a
result
that
at
least
one
astute
lawyer
forecast
less
than
a
year
ago)
has
them
gnashing
their
teeth
in
anguish.
Cyril
Vetter
co-wrote
the
song,
Double
Shot.
He
transferred
global
rights
away
back
in
the
day
to
a
company
that
transferred
them
to
Resnick
Music
Group
(RMG).
This
transfer
was
entered
into
in
the
U.S.
and
had
no
connection
to
anywhere
else
in
the
world
other
than
it
included
a
global
transfer.
When
Vetter
served
a
notice
terminating
this
global-rights
transfer,
and
seeking
to
recover
all
rights
transferred
thereunder,
RMG
refused
to
honor
the
transfer
for
any
country
other
than
the
U.S.
Why?
The
label’s
primary
argument
hinged
on
language
in
Section
304(c)(6)(E),
which
states
that
“[t]ermination
of
a
grant
under
this
subsection
affects
only
those
rights
covered
by
the
grant
that
arise
under
this
title,
and
in
no
way
affects
rights
arising
under
any
other
Federal,
State,
or
foreign
laws.”
The
label
employed
a
facile
reading
of
the
foregoing
to
argue
that
because
the
rights
“arising
under
this
title”
in
no
way
affect
rights
“arising
under”
foreign
law,
the
termination
of
the
grant
does
not
apply
to
the
exploitation
of
the
song
in
other
countries.
But,
as
the
Fifth
Circuit
pointed
out
in
ruling
for
the
artist,
this
zany
position
“was
premised
on
the
theory
that
there
are
multiple
and
separate
copyright
interests
in
each
country,
rather
than
a
single
overarching
international
master
copyright
that
each
country
is
required
to
honor.”
Vetter
v.
Resnik,
No.
25-30108,
2026
WL
82842,
(5th
Cir.
Jan.
12,
2026).
Make
no
mistake,
the
labels
invented
this
bizarro
copyright-multiverse
solely
to
stymie
artists
in
recovering
their
global
rights.
It
exists
in
no
other
context.
To
the
contrary,
it
is
almost
universally
accepted
that
one
copyright
is
created
under
U.S.
law
once
an
artist
fixes
their
work
in
a
tangible
medium
and
other
countries
honor
that
copyright
via
various
treaties,
chiefly
the
Berne
Convention.
And
it
is
also
settled
law
that
questions
of
copyright
ownership
for
works
created
in
the
U.S.
by
U.S.
artists
are
covered
by
U.S.
law.
A
close
read
of
the
language
exposes
the
speciousness
of
the
label’s
argument.
The
word
“arise”
means
“to
originate
from
a
source”
and
the
“rights”
that
arise
under
the
Copyright
Act
are
the
exclusive
rights
set
forth
in
Section
106,
which
include
the
exclusive
right
to
reproduce,
distribute,
and
perform,
and
the
right
to
reclaim
those
rights
after
the
statutory
period
expures.
The
artist
who
transfers
those
rights
away
can
later
recapture
them
without
regard
for
where
those
rights
are
exercised.
So,
if
the
initial
contract
includes
the
global
right
to
exercise
those
copyrights,
a
termination
recovers
the
global
rights.
Now
there
is
a
general
rule
that
the
Copyright
Act
does
not
apply
extraterritorially
when
it
comes
to
copyright
infringement,
and
the
labels
have
done
well
in
the
past
to
conflate
the
issues
of
“ownership”
and
“infringement”
in
their
briefs.
But
the
Vetter
court
rightfully
swept
those
arguments
away,
adroitly
recognizing
that
ownership
and
infringement
are
two
separate
copyright
law
concepts,
with
ownership
established
by
the
laws
of
the
country
of
creation
and
infringement
being
addressed
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
the
infringement
occurred.
The
result
is
unsurprising
because
the
Supreme
Court
already,
in
Kirtsaeng
v.
John
Wiley
&
Sons,
Inc.,
looked
at
similar
“under
this
title”
language
in
the
Copyright
Act
and
found
there
to
be
no
geographic
limitation.
There,
copies
of
works
created
“under”
the
Copyright
Act
were
copies
created
anywhere
in
the
world,
not
just
the
U.S.
So
true
here,
as
Vetter’s
ownership
rights
arose
under
the
Copyright
Act
and
his
termination
of
a
transfer
of
that
ownership
returned
to
him
that
ownership,
with
no
geographic
limitation.
Thus,
the
first
appellate
court
to
review
the
Copyright
Act’s
reclamation
provisions
has
concluded,
convincingly,
that
the
provisions,
enacted
to
assist
artists
in
reaping
a
bit
more
of
their
creations’
benefits,
covers
the
“worldwide”
portion
of
worldwide
transfers
and
includes
no
geographic
carve-out
for
the
rest
of
the
planet.
2026
will
thus
be
the
year
that
these
particular
artists’
rights
shrug
off
their
cartographic
limitations,
and
artists
will
benefit,
as
Congress
intended.
Scott
Alan
Burroughs,
Esq.
practices
with Doniger
/
Burroughs,
an
art
law
firm
based
in
Venice,
California.
He
represents
artists
and
content
creators
of
all
stripes
and
writes
and
speaks
regularly
on
copyright
issues.
He
can
be
reached
at [email protected],
and
you
can
follow
his
law
firm
on
Instagram: @veniceartlaw.