Last
night,
a
three-judge
panel
from
the
Eleventh
Circuit
issued
a
spectacular
smackdown
of
US
District
Judge
Aileen
Cannon’s
handling
of
the
Trump
warrant
case.
“Whether
a
court
should
exercise
its
equitable
jurisdiction
in
this
context
‘is
subject
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
district
court,’”
wrote
Judges
Grant
and
Brasher,
both
Trump
appointees,
and
Judge
Rosenbaum,
who
was
put
on
the
bench
by
Obama.
“But
that
discretion
is
not
boundless.”
In
a
per
curiam
ruling,
the
panel
laid
waste
to
Judge
Cannon’s
refusal
to
exclude
classified
documents
seized
at
Mar-a-Lago
from
the
special
master
review
process,
as
well
as
her
ban
on
the
FBI
using
them
in
its
ongoing
criminal
investigation.
And
while
the
government’s
motion
for
partial
stay
was
narrow,
it’s
clear
that,
should
the
government
file
a
fuller
appeal,
the
logic
undergirding
last
night’s
holding
would
be
fatal
to
the
trial
court’s
finding
of
anomalous
jurisdiction
to
appoint
Judge
Raymond
Dearie
as
special
master.
Although
Trump’s
lawyers
failed
to
plead
it,
Cannon
used
the
four
factor
test
from
Richey
v.
Smith,
515
F.2d
1239,
1243
(5th
Cir.
1975)
to
find
equitable
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
Despite
Donald
Trump’s
public
tantrums
on
his
social
media
sites,
none
of
the
parties
have
alleged
in
court
that
the
FBI
behaved
with
“callous
disregard”
for
Donald
Trump’s
rights
when
it
conducted
the
search
pursuant
to
a
duly
executed
warrant.
And
so
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
fails
on
the
first,
and
most
important
prong
of
the
Richey
test.
“The
absence
of
this
‘indispensab[le]’
factor
in
the
Richey
analysis
is
reason
enough
to
conclude
that
the
district
court
abused
its
discretion
in
exercising
equitable
jurisdiction
here,”
the
panel
writes
witheringly.
“But
for
the
sake
of
completeness,
we
consider
the
remaining
factors.”
Cue
the
Jaws
music.
Note
that,
while
this
ruling
pertains
only
to
the
classified
documents,
that
logic
would
be
fatal
to
Judge
Cannon’s
entire
exercise
of
jurisdiction
here.
And
in
case
that
hearty
judicial
dunking
wasn’t
clear,
the
panel
points
out
that
her
reliance
on
Rule
41(g)
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure
in
a
civil
dispute
where
no
Rule
41
motion
has
ever
been
pled
is
similarly
ridiculous.
As
to
the
other Richey
factors,
the
panel
had
major
side
eye
for
Judge
Cannon’s
disregard
of
classification
markings
in
an
effort
to
pretend
that
perhaps
those
documents
were
personal
property
in
which
Trump
could
have
a
possessory
interest.
“For
our
part,
we
cannot
discern
why
Plaintiff
would
have
an
individual
interest
in
or
need
for
any
of
the
one-hundred
documents
with
classification
markings,”
they
write,
noting
in
an
ominous
echo
of
the
statutes
mentioned
in
the
search
warrant
that
there’s
simply
no
reason
for
anyone
to
stash
national
defense
documents
in
a
pool
locker,
and
that
“[t]his
requirement
pertains
equally
to
former
Presidents.”
Nor
could
the
appellate
court
make
out
any
irreparable
harm
which
could
come
to
Donald
Trump
from
the
government
being
able
to
examine
its
own
documents
—
or
at
least
no
harm
which
is
legally
cognizable,
because,
“while
the
threat
of
prosecution
can
weigh
heavily
on
the
mind
of
someone
under
investigation,”
it’s
not
generally
a
basis
for
criminal
suspects
to
claw
back
evidence.
As
to
the
fourth
prong,
if
Trump
really
wanted
his
personal
property
back,
he
could
just
file
the
damn
Rule
41
motion
already
and
take
his
chances
with
Magistrate
Judge
Bruce
Reinhart.
The
court
goes
on
to
spend
four
whole
pages
reading
Judge
Cannon
for
filth
over
her
blatant
disregard
for
national
security,
both
in
her
blasé
treatment
of
classified
documents
and
her
contemptuous
dismissal
of
the
government’s
sworn
affidavit
that
it
cannot
bifurcate
the
national
security
investigation
of
the
mishandled
documents
from
the
criminal
one.
“The
Supreme
Court
has
recognized
that
for
reasons
‘too
obvious
to
call
for
enlarged
discussion,
the
protection
of
classified
information
must
be
committed
to
the
broad
discretion
of
the
agency
responsible,
and
this
must
include
broad
discretion
to
determine
who
may
have
access
to
it,’”
they
write.
“As
a
result,
courts
should
order
review
of
such
materials
in
only
the
most
extraordinary
circumstances.
The
record
does
not
allow
for
the
conclusion
that
this
is
such
a
circumstance.”
As
to
Trump’s
suggestion
that maybe
he
declassified
the
seized
documents
before
leaving
the
White
House,
the
court
notes
that
“the
record
contains
no
evidence
that
any
of
these
records
were
declassified.
And
before
the
special
master,
Plaintiff
resisted
providing
any
evidence
that
he
had
declassified
any
of
these
documents.”
Which
does
not
bode
well
for
Trump’s
prospects
at
the
Eleventh
Circuit
should
he
be
indicted
in
the
state
of
Florida.
All
in
all,
it
was
a
humiliating
bench
slap
for
Judge
Cannon
from
her
appellate
colleagues.
But
for
Donald
Trump
…
it
was
worse.
Liz
Dye
lives
in
Baltimore
where
she
writes
about
law
and
politics.