Speaking
during
CITE’s
X
Space
discussion
on
the
new
amendment
bill
on
Thursday,
Prof
Moyo,
who
was
involved
in
constitutional
reform
processes
in
the
past
25
years,
framed
the
debate
as
one
that
must
move
beyond
slogans
and
confront
what
he
termed
the
“mischief”
the
Bill,
approved
by
Cabinet
last
week
and
gazetted
by
Parliament
this
week,
“seeks
to
cure.”
Prof
Moyo
said
he
participated
in
both
the
people-driven
constitutional
exercise
that
produced
the
2000
draft
constitution
under
the
Constitutional
Commission
and
the
later
political
compromise
between
Zanu
PF
and
the
two
MDC
formations
that
culminated
in
the
2013
Constitution.
“It
is
my
considered
view
that
the
Constitution
of
Zimbabwe
Amendment
No.
3
Bill
represents
a
profound
recalibration
of
our
country’s
democratic
or
political
architecture,”
he
said.
“The
foundational
question
of
my
intervention
this
morning
is
based
on
this
question
that
I
pose:
What
is
the
motivation
or
mischief
that
the
bill
is
addressing?
It’s
not
just
dropping
into
our
midst
or
body
politic
like
manna
from
heaven.
It
is
a
response
to
a
particular
situation
or
mischief
which
motivates
it.
And
to
have
a
meaningful
debate,
I
think
it
is
important
to
unpack
or
understand
that
mischief.
In
my
view,
the
mischief
being
addressed
by
this
bill
is
twofold.”
The
first
“mischief,”
he
argued,
lies
in
the
origins
of
Zimbabwe’s
executive
presidency.
According
to
Prof
Moyo,
the
current
system
of
directly
electing
a
powerful
executive
president
traces
back
to
the
1987
constitutional
amendment,
enacted
during
a
period
when
the
ruling
establishment
anticipated
the
consolidation
of
a
one-party
state.
“When
this
system
was
introduced
at
that
time,
it
was
in
anticipation
of
the
establishment
of
a
one-party
state,”
he
said.
“The
1987
amendment
was
enacted
with,
explicitly
the
intentions,
of
establishing
a
one-party
state
in
our
country.”
However,
the
anticipated
one-party
dispensation
did
not
materialise.
By
2000,
the
government
initiated
a
constitutional
review
process
to
address
what
Prof
Moyo
described
as
“structural
consequences
flowing
from
the
1987
changes.”
The
2000
draft
constitution
proposed
a
hybrid
arrangement
that
would
have
restored
a
prime
minister
drawn
from
the
parliamentary
majority
as
head
of
government,
while
retaining
a
president
as
head
of
state
with
reduced
powers.
Unlike
that
draft,
the
2013
Constitution
retained
the
executive
presidency
largely
intact.
“The
2013
constitution
did
not
even
attempt
to
address
the
issues
related
or
rooted
in
the
1987
amendment,”
Prof
Moyo
said.
“Instead,
it
retained
the
presidency
created
in
1987
in
anticipation
of
a
one-party
state,
but
this
time
under
a
constitutional
framework
for
a
multi-party
democracy.”
The
result,
Prof
Moyo
argued,
has
been
an
enduring
structural
contradiction.
“The
constitution
enacted
in
2013
presupposes
the
existence
of
a
multi-party
democracy.
But
the
executive
presidency
inherited
without
even
a
single
amendment
was
enacted
anticipating
that
by
1990
there
would
be
a
one-party
state,”
he
said.
“The
fact
that
this
was
retained
in
2013
by
a
constitution
whose
framework
anticipates
a
multi-party
democracy
naturally
led
to
a
self-evident
structural
breakdown,
exemplified
by
the
scourge
of
disputed
presidential
elections
and
the
toxicity
associated
with
it.”
The
proposed
Bill
seeks,
among
other
changes,
to
transform
the
system
of
electing
the
president
by
moving
from
a
direct
popular
vote
to
an
indirect
election
through
Parliament,
while
also
extending
the
national
electoral
cycle.
Prof
Moyo
maintains
that
this
would
reduce
the
“perpetual
conflict
mode”
that
has
characterised
Zimbabwean
politics
for
decades.
The
second
“mischief”,
he
argued,
concerns
the
short
electoral
cycles
inherited
from
colonial
constitutional
models.
“Over
the
years,
countries
such
as
Zimbabwe
adopted
four
or
five-year
terms
of
office
for
the
executive
and
legislature,”
he
said.
“The
period
is
too
short
and
tends
to
perpetuate
permanent
election
modes,
with
the
next
election
starting
immediately
after
the
last,
breeding
populism,
exacerbating
societal
divisions,
ethnic
divisions
and
leading
to
bureaucratic
inefficiency.”
He
cited
comparative
data
from
several
African
Commonwealth
countries,
arguing
that
shorter
terms
have
often
incentivised
divisive
rhetoric
and
undermined
long-term
planning
in
fragile
institutional
contexts.
“Traditional
enemies
or
grievances
of
the
people
that
fueled
the
nationalist
struggle,
hunger,
poverty,
disease,
ignorance,
are
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
to
address
within
shorter
election
cycles,”
he
said.
Prof
Moyo
contended
that
by
amending
sections
92,
95(2B),
143(1)
and
158(1)
of
Zimbabwe’s
Constitution,
the
Bill
addresses
these
two
structural
problems
without
dismantling
the
fundamental
architecture
of
government.
“It
does
so
not
by
altering
the
structure
of
government
or
its
fundamental
institutions,
but
principally
by
transforming
the
system
of
electing
the
president
and
the
duration
of
the
national
election
cycle,
which
affects
only
two
branches
of
government,”
he
said.
He
dismissed
arguments
that
executive
authority
must
always
be
exercised
through
direct
election.
“Those
who
say
executive
power
is
derived
from
the
people
and
therefore
you
must
have
direct
elections
must
confront
the
reality
that
judicial
power
is
also
derived
from
the
people,
but
the
people
do
not
directly
elect
the
judges,”
he
said.
However,
Prof
Moyo’s
defence
of
the
Bill
stands
in
sharp
contrast
to
mounting
criticism
from
constitutional
law
experts
and
legal
scholars
who
argue
that
the
proposals
collide
with
entrenched
constitutional
safeguards.
Section
328(7)
of
the
Constitution
provides
that
changes
to
presidential
term
limits
require
approval
through
a
referendum.
Moreover,
even
where
term
limits
are
extended,
the
Constitution
stipulates
that
such
amendments
should
not
benefit
an
incumbent
unless
subjected
to
an
additional,
person-specific
referendum.
Critics
argue
that
altering
the
system
of
presidential
election
and
extending
terms
of
office
risks
violating
both
the
spirit
and
letter
of
these
protections.
They
contend
any
changes
affecting
presidential
tenure
must
not
only
pass
through
Parliament
with
a
two-thirds
majority
but
also
secure
approval
in
a
national
referendum.
Prof
Moyo,
claims
the
debate
must
shift
from
suspicion
to
structural
analysis.
“This
constitutional
reform
package
directly
tackles
the
two
situations
I
have
outlined,”
he
insisted.
“The
question
is
whether
we
are
prepared
to
confront
the
structural
contradictions
we
inherited,
or
whether
we
continue
to
manage
symptoms.”