David
B.
Moore,
University
of
Johannesburg
Zimbabwe’s
ruling
party,
Zanu-PF,
wants
to
amend
the
constitution
through
a
bill
in
parliament.
It
won’t
be
that
simple,
however.
Under
the
constitution,
voters
must
approve
such
changes
through
a
referendum.
The
new
bill’s
most
significant
proposals
include
extending
presidential
and
parliamentary
terms
by
two
years.
This
would
allow
Zimbabwe’s
83-year-old
president,
Emmerson
Mnangagwa,
to
remain
in
power
until
2030,
ending
the
hopes
of
vice-president
Constantino
Chiwenga
reaching
the
presidency
in
2028.
Chiwenga,
as
the
head
of
the
armed
forces,
was
the
main
organiser
of
the
2017
coup
that
brought
the
exiled
Mnangagwa
to
power.
The
proposals
could
also
pave
the
way
for
further
changes
that
help
Zanu-PF
realise
its
long-cherished
dream
of
permanent
rule.
The
amendment
proposes
ending
direct
presidential
elections.
Instead,
the
president
would
be
chosen
by
members
of
parliament.
Given
that
Zanu-PF
can,
and
has,
co-opted
enough
MPs
to
dominate
parliament,
this
would
consolidate
executive
power
within
the
ruling
party.
Other
proposed
changes
include
expanding
the
senate
to
90
members
and
returning
the
electoral
commission
to
a
largely
discredited
registrar-general
who
has
been
accused
of
bias.
The
bill
also
creates
a
Delimitation
Commission
that
would
allow
the
ruling
party
to
shift
constituency
boundaries.
I
have
researched
and
written
on
Zimbabwe’s
political
history
and
political
economy
since
the
early
1980s.
In
my
view,
these
changes
risk
weakening
already
fragile
democratic
protections
in
Zimbabwe.
Extending
term
limits
entrenches
incumbency.
Long-serving
president
Robert
Mugabe
established
de-facto
one-party
rule
–
always
contested,
but
maintained
consistently
by
carefully
calibrated
doses
of
coercion,
cheating
and
crafted
consensus
–
in
1987
as
he
became
executive
president.
This
followed
the
genocidal
Gukurahundi
massacre
of
the
1980s
when
thousands
of
people
were
killed
as
Zimbabwe’s
main
opposition
party
was
crushed.
The
military
forced
Mugabe
to
resign
in
2017
under
“Operation
Restore
Legacy”.
Mugabe
was
at
the
time
93.
The
coup
was
later
legitimised
by
being
given
the
“military-assisted
transition”
label.
Zanu-PF
veteran
Mnangagwa,
who
had
been
Mugabe’s
recently
fired
deputy,
and
since
1978
his
key
security
advisor,
took
on
his
mantle.
This
transition
was
violently
consummated
with
a
contested
election
in
2018
and
vicious
quelling
of
the
January
2019
“stay-away”
protests
calling
on
the
state
to
improve
citizen
livelihoods.
These
latest
proposed
amendments
–
dubbed
Agenda
2030
–
point
to
a
system
where
political
competition
is
narrowed
and
power
is
more
tightly
controlled
by
the
ruling
party
and
its
leaders.
What
it
means
for
Zimbabwe
Removing
direct
presidential
elections
reduces
voter
choice.
The
weakening
of
independent
institutions
–
including
electoral
and
judicial
bodies
–
further
reduces
accountability.
The
constitutional
amendment
proposes
that
the
presidential
vote
take
place
in
parliament
by
party-based
MPs,
who
would
likely
elect
one
of
their
own.
However,
the
generally
unpopular
ruling
party
fears
going
through
the
necessary
referendum
to
pass
such
changes.
Additionally,
90
days
of
public
consultation
on
constitutional
amendments
are
needed.
The
Zanu-PF
state
has
already
compressed
these
to
four
days
at
about
65
locations,
allowing
about
an
hour
each
for
discussion.
The
first
meetings
were
stacked
with
busloads
of
Zanu-PF
supporters.
And
as
happens
during
the
party’s
rallies,
there
were
gifts
of
bikes
and
food
as
the
carrots,
and
intimidation
and
threats
as
the
sticks.
Besides
this
mix,
session
chairs
ignored
opposition
efforts
to
voice
their
opinions.
By
the
end
of
the
second
day
of
these
meetings,
the
coalition
of
the
three
“defend
the
constitution”
movements
opposing
Zanu-PF’s
proposals
boycotted
the
hearings.
No
matter:
Zanu-PF
will
either
choose
to
push
a
referendum
forward
(with
low
participation)
or
pursue
more
repressive
and/or
judicially
engineered
means
to
secure
the
amendments.
What
it
means
for
Zanu-PF
The
proposed
constitutional
amendments
also
have
major
implications
within
Zanu-PF
itself,
particularly
for
Chiwenga.
They
would
effectively
end
his
chances
of
becoming
president
in
2028.
In
2008,
highly
contested
presidential
election
results
forced
Mugabe
and
opposition
leader
Morgan
Tsvangirai
to
a
run-off.
As
is
widely
acknowledged,
Mnangagwa
and
Chiwenga
–
then
leading
Zimbabwe’s
Joint
Operations
Command
–
agreed
to
let
Mugabe
stay
on.
They
would
strike
at
a
more
opportune
time:
Mnangagwa
would
then
lead
first,
and
Chiwenga
would
take
power
in
the
next
term.
The
severe
violence
during
the
run-off
led
to
a
transitional
inclusive
government.
This
eventually
led
to
the
development
of
the
2013
constitution,
which
introduced
a
two-term
limit
for
the
presidency.
At
a
Zanu-PF
congress
soon
after
the
2018
election,
Mnangagwa
announced
he’d
vie
again
in
2023.
Now,
the
proposed
extension
to
2030
effectively
blocks
Chiwenga’s
path
to
the
presidency.
At
the
very
least,
those
two
years
would
allow
Mnangagwa
to
consolidate
his
–
and
his
family’s
–
power.
Zanu-PF’s
ever
present
factional
tensions
will
be
exacerbated.
As
my
book
Mugabe’s
Legacy:
Coups,
Conspiracies,
and
the
Conceits
of
Power
in
Zimbabwe
argues,
Zanu-PF’s
past
and
present
–
before,
during
and
after
the
liberation
war
–
are
replete
with
factional
fighting
as
those
near
its
top
seek
to
entrench
one-party
rule
with
its
control
over
the
country’s
wealth.
What
it
means
for
opposition
politics
Zimbabwe’s
opposition
remains
fragmented
and
weakened.
The
once-powerful
Movement
for
Democratic
Change
splintered
and
its
closest
successor
succumbed
to
Zanu-PF,
partly
induced
by
its
leader’s
megalomania.
After
the
boycott
of
the
hearings,
how
will
the
proposed
constitutional
amendments
be
stopped?
Resistance
to
the
proposals
had
created
an
opportunity
for
greater
opposition
unity.
Events
such
as
the
October
2025
firebombing
of
a
civil
society
meeting
meant
to
discuss
the
amendments
foretold
the
current
intimidation.
Will
the
changes
sail
through?
Success
on
the
constitutional
amendments
is
not
guaranteed.
Internal
factional
tensions,
particularly
around
succession,
could
complicate
the
process.
Chiwenga
is
far
from
the
only
challenger
in
Mnangagwa’s
sight.
If
(when?)
the
shambolic
–
yet
brutal
–
ruling
party
manages
to
move
to
a
post-Agenda
2030
phase,
it
may
well
crash
under
the
weight
of
its
own
contradictions.
And
with
it
all
of
Zimbabwe
goes.
David
B.
Moore,
Research
Associate,
Dept
of
Anthropology
&
Development
Studies
and
Fellow,
Clare
Hall,
University
of
Cambridge,
University
of
Johannesburg
This
article
is
republished
from
The
Conversation
under
a
Creative
Commons
license.
Read
the
original
article.