The
targeted
sanctions
regime,
first
established
in
2003,
was
intended
to
pressure
and
isolate
those
most
responsible
for
political
violence
and
the
collapse
of
the
Zimbabwean
economy.
Policymakers
hoped
that
establishing
concrete
disincentives
for
the
worst
excesses
in
the
country
would
stem
the
tide
of
authoritarianism
and
kleptocracy,
creating
more
space
for
the
many
Zimbabweans
who
wish
to
express
their
political
views
without
reason
to
fear,
and
who
support
genuine
democracy,
accountability,
and
the
rule
of
law.
Nearly
two
decades
on,
the
sanctions
regime
has
succeeded
in
inconveniencing
some
of
the
most
odious
actors
in
Zimbabwe.
But
it
has
not
stopped
Zimbabwe’s
seemingly
endless
descent
into
dictatorship
and
despair,
in
which
a
small
circle
of
elites
enrich
themselves
and
protect
their
access
to
power
while
the
rest
of
the
country
suffers.
At
the
same
time,
sanctions
serve
as
a
handy
scapegoat
for
those
elites,
who
often
mischaracterize
them
as
a
blanket
ban
on
trade
and
investment
in
Zimbabwe
and
assert
that
these
restrictions,
rather
than
their
own
mismanagement,
are
to
blame
for
the
country’s
troubles.
The
result
is
a
disheartening
stasis.
The
individuals
and
entities
on
the
list
continue
their
repression
and
self-dealing,
offering
neither
justification
for
lifting
restrictions
that
target
them,
nor
hope
that
those
restrictions
will
be
sufficient
to
disincentivize
further
brutality.
Instead,
as
the
2023
elections
draw
closer
in
Zimbabwe,
the
situation
in
the
country
seems
to
be
getting
worse.
Opposition
parliamentarians
Job
Sikhala
and
Godfrey
Sithole
languish
in
detention
on
dubious charges,
while
their
family
members
find
themselves targeted by
security
services.
Political
activists
have
good
reason
to
fear
even
worse treatment.
An
eyebrow-raising report
about
the
state’s
recent
harassment
of
visiting
U.S.
congressional
staffers
suggests
that
the
Zimbabwean
authorities
have
no
interest
in
even
affecting
a
façade
for
outsiders.
They
want
the
sanctions
lifted,
but
also
openly
intend
to
continue
down
a
path
of
violent,
repressive,
ultimately
ruinous
governance.
The
sanctions
have
also
become
something
of
an irritant in
Washington’s
relations
with
other
African states and
the
issue
was
among
the
items
on
South
African
President
Cyril
Ramaphosa’s agenda in
his
bilateral
meeting
with
President
Biden
last
week.
Xenophobia
is
on
the
rise
in
South
Africa
and
attempting
to
address
upstream
factors
pushing
migrants
across
the
border
makes
sense.
But
it
is
difficult
to
imagine
that
Ramaphosa
or
other
Southern
African
leaders
really
believe
that
Zimbabwe’s
economy
will
recover
due
to
a
decision
made
in
Washington.
Would
Zimbabweans
who
fled
their
dysfunctional
country
wish
to
return
if
only
leaders
responsible
for
political
violence
could
do
business
unencumbered
by
targeted
sanctions?
Would
Zimbabwe’s
business
climate
have
a
positive
reputation
if
only
the
entities
siphoning
off
state
resources
were
not
on
a
sanctions
list?
For
too
many
African
leaders,
pretending
to
believe
in
these
unlikely
propositions
is
apparently
far
more
comfortable
than
acknowledging
the
rot
at
the
heart
of
the
Zimbabwean
state,
or
their
own role in
enabling
it.