WASHINGTON
—
President
Donald
Trump
has
released
a
new
executive
order
(EO)
setting
national
space
policy
across
the
civil,
commercial
and
defense
sectors
—
setting
a
goal
of
establishing
an
“initial”
Moon
base
by
2028
and
reiterating
the
administration’s
Golden
Dome
plans
for
a
comprehensive
air
and
missile
defense
shield
over
America.
Perhaps
the
most
notable
thing
about
the
new
EO
is
the
title,
“Ensuring
American
Space
Superiority,”
especially
as
the
document
focuses
on
civil
space
exploration
rather
than
defense.
The
phrase
“space
superiority”
traditionally
has
served
as
a
military
term
of
art
for
controlling
the
heavens
to
prevent
adversaries
from
taking
actions
to
harm
US
space
assets.
The
Space
Force
defines
space
superiority
as
follows:
“A
degree
of
that
allows
military
forces
in
all
domains
to
operate
at
a
time
and
place
of
their
choosing
without
prohibitive
interference
from
space
or
counterspace
threats,
while
also
denying
the
same
to
an
adversary.”
But
the
EO,
published
Thursday,
is
primarily
centered
around
specific
goals
for
NASA.
For
example,
it
states
that
America
will
return
to
the
Moon
by
2028,
and
mandates
the
establishment
of
“initial
elements
of
a
permanent
lunar
outpost
by
2030”
to
include
launching
by
nuclear
reactors
for
use
on
the
lunar
surface.
It
further
calls
for
“enhancing
sustainability
and
cost-effectiveness
of
launch
and
exploration
architectures,
including
enabling
commercial
launch
services
and
prioritizing
lunar
exploration.”
Finally,
it
reiterates
the
US
intention
to
abandon
the
International
Space
Station
by
2030.
The
policy’s
three-paragraph
section
on
security
and
the
Defense
Department’s
role,
by
contrast,
is
more
vague
—
and
reflects
current
Pentagon
policy.
First,
it
reiterates
Trump’s
January
EO
that
launched
the
Pentagon’s
Golden
Dome,
restating
the
goal
to
develop
and
demonstration
“prototype
next-generation
missile
defense
technologies”
by
2028.
Second,
it
calls
for
“creating
a
responsive
and
adaptive
national
security
space
architecture
by
accelerating
acquisition
reform,
integrating
commercial
space
capabilities,
and
enabling
new
market
entrants.”
Lastly,
the
security
section
states
that
the
US
will
strengthen
“ally
and
partner
contributions
to
United
States
and
collective
space
security,
including
through
increased
space
security
spending,
operational
cooperation,
basing
agreements,
and
ally
and
partner
investments
in
America’s
space
industrial
base.”
The
EO
gives
Defense
Secretary
Pete
Hegseth
90
days,
“in
coordination
with”
the
director
of
national
intelligence
and
the
head
of
the
White
House
Office
of
Technology
Policy,
to
report
on
“any
technology,
supply
chain,
or
industrial
capacity
gaps
relevant
to
this
order’s
directive
to
progressively
and
materially
enhance
America’s
air
and
missile
defenses,
and
plans
for
mitigating
such
gaps
within
available
funding.”
Within
180
days,
the
Pentagon
must
“implement
a
space
security
strategy
that
accounts
for
United
States
interests
in,
from,
and
to
space;
addresses
current
and
projected
threats
to
United
States
space
interests
from
very
low-Earth
orbit
through
cislunar
space;
and
incorporates
a
technology
plan
for
detecting,
characterizing,
and
countering
potential
adversary
placement
of
nuclear
weapons
in
space.”
(The
United
States
has
accused
Russia
of
researching
a
space
nuke
to
wipe
out
satellites
in
orbit.)
Also
within
that
timeframe,
DoD
is
to
implement
a
plan
for
a
“responsive
and
adaptive
national
security
space
architecture.”
How
that
may
differ,
if
at
all,
from
the
current
Space
Force
architecture
that
has
gradually
been
shifting
from
small
constellations
of
large
satellites
in
the
geosynchronous
Earth
orbit
belt
some
36,000
kilometers
above
the
surface
to
large
constellations
of
small
satellites
in
various
orbits
remains
to
be
seen.
The
EO
also
addresses
commercial
issues,
most
strikingly
by
the
commitment
to
“attracting
at
least
$50
billion
of
additional
investment
in
American
space
markets
by
2028”
—
although
no
detailed
instructions
are
provided
about
how
that
it
to
be
done.
The
commercial
section
also
makes
a
pledge
for
“increasing
launch
and
reentry
cadence
through
new
and
upgraded
facilities,
improved
efficiency,
and
policy
reforms.”
It
also
tasks
the
Secretary
of
Commerce
to
lead
an
initiative
“to
assert
spectrum
leadership,
which
shall
include
considering
opportunities
for
reapportioning
and
sharing
spectrum,
as
appropriate.”
The
document
does
not,
however,
explain
what
is
meant
by
“spectrum
leadership.”
Surprising
no
one,
the
EO
kills
the
National
Space
Council,
which
ironically
was
last
resuscitated
in
Trump’s
first
term.
Industry
and
government
officials
have
told
Breaking
Defense
that
unlike
Trump’s
first
vice
president
Mike
Pence,
J.D.
Vance
has
little
interest
in
space
issues
and
did
not
want
the
job
of
chairing
the
council.
The
policy
also
seems
to
put
a
stake
in
the
heart
of
another
Trump
1
initiative
already
facing
dismantlement
due
to
budget
cuts
by
the
Office
of
Management
and
Budget:
the
Commerce
Department
effort
to
develop
a
civil
space
traffic
management
system.
The
Traffic
Coordination
System
for
Space
(TraCSS)
program
was
designed
to
take
the
burden
of
providing
data
on
the
whereabouts
of
space
objects
and
warnings
of
potential
on-orbit
collisions
to
non-military
operators.
The
2018
Space
Policy
Directive-3
states
that
a
“basic”
data
and
tracking
services
“should
be
available
free
of
direct
user
fees.”
The
EO
would
change
that
language
to
read
“available
for
commercial
and
other
relevant
use.”
It
is
highly
unclear
whether
any
commercial
space
operator
would
be
willing
to
pay
the
government
for
such
services.
