Author: TSA Press

Such
livelihoods
are
intimately
bound
up
with
nature,
and
the
complex
and
diverse
ecosystems
that
thrive
on
land.
Land
creates
a
sense
of
identity
refracted
through
gender,
race,
class
and
other
axes
of
difference. 
Through
diverse
institutions
and
forms
of
authority,
land
connects
citizens
and
states,
corporations
and
capital,
and
is
the
locus
of
accumulation,
extraction
and
control.
Access
to
land
is
thus
contested,
negotiated
and
claimed
through
multiple,
competing
actors,
linked
to
a
myriad
of
struggles.
Land,
in
other
words,
connects
us
all
through
its
politics.

This
is
why
the
newly-published Oxford
Handbook
of
Land
Politics is
so
important.
Across
38
chapters
and
a
mammoth
880
pages,
written
by
a
veritable
who’s
who
of
the
broad
field
of
critical
agrarian
studies,
the
book
offers
an
invaluable
guide
to
these
debates,
with
a
stellar overview
and
introduction from
its
editors,
Jun
Borras
and
Jenny
Franco.
What
follows
are
some
reflections
taken
from
the Foreword that
I
wrote.

At
the
end
of
the
Foreword,
I
ask,
what
are
the
new
axes
of
debate,
transforming
our
understandings
of
agrarian
change
and
politics
of
land
offered
in
the
pages
of
the
Handbook?
There
are
many,
but
I
highlight
just
four.

• First
  is
  the
  move
  from
  seeing
  land
  as
  only
  a
  site
  of
  production
  and
  so
  accumulation,
  but
  also
  social
  reproduction,
  and
  the
  locus
  of
  highly
  gendered
  social
  and
  cultural
  relations.
  This
  suggests
  a
  much
  more
  diverse
  land
  politics
  going
  beyond
  class
  to
  gender,
  race,
  identity
  and
  so
  on.
  It
  in
  turn
  suggests
  a
  renewed
  focus
  on
  labour,
  with
  complex
  livelihoods
  generated
  from
  multiple
  sources
  beyond
  the
  fixed
  plot
  of
  land,
  through
  migration,
  trade
  and
  so
  on.
  The
  classic
  categories
  of
  land-based
  classes
  centred
  only
  on
  production
  are
  thus
  unsettled
  as
  new
  forms
  of
  livelihood
  are
  created.
  As
  a
  result,
  the
  dynamics
  of
  differentiation
  and
  accumulation
  shifts,
  with
  land
  politics
  changing
  as
  a
  wider
  appreciation
  emerges
  of
  Henry
  Bernstein’s
  classic
  questions
  of
  agrarian
  political
  economy
  –
  who
  owns
  what,
  who
  does
  what,
  who
  gets
  what
  and
  what
  they
  do
  with
  it?

• Second,
  the
  centring
  of
  nature,
  environment
  and
  climate
  in
  relation
  to
  land
  is
  a
  theme
  that
  resonates
  across
  many
  chapters.
  Humans
  and
  nature
  (and
  so
  land)
  are
  inseparable
  yet
  have
  often
  become
  disconnected
  by
  the
  forces
  of
  capitalist
  modernity.
  The
  importance
  of
  reconnecting
  is
  central,
  requiring
  a
  new
  political
  ecology/economy
  of
  land.
  This
  has
  deep
  implications
  for
  how
  we
  see
  land;
  again
  not
  just
  as
  a
  demarcated
  plot,
  but
  as
  part
  of
  a
  wider
  living
  landscape
  and
  territory,
  within
  a
  broader
  planetary
  system.
  This
  in
  turn
  highlights
  the
  crucial
  connection
  between
  land
  and
  the
  climate
  crisis.
  Changing
  land
  use,
  whether
  through
  deforestation,
  intensive
  agriculture
  and
  extraction
  of
  water
  or
  minerals
  is
  a
  major
  contributor
  to
  climate
  change.
  As
  the
  regimes
  of
  extraction
  evolve
  under
  new
  frontiers
  of
  capitalism,
  land
  is
  central.
  Such
  regimes
  of
  food,
  water
  and
  energy
  are
  constituted
  through
  a
  contested
  politics
  and,
  as
  the
  imperative
  to
  switch
  from
  fossil
  fuel
  dependence
  and
  intensive,
  polluting
  systems
  of
  agriculture
  accelerates,
  new
  challenges
  emerge.
  In
  the
  rush
  to
  ‘net
  zero’,
  for
  example,
  alternative
  energy,
  climate
  adaptation
  and
  nature-based
  ‘solutions’
  are
  offered,
  yet
  all
  these
  have
  implications
  for
  who
  controls
  the
  land,
  with
  land
  grabs
  increasingly
  justified
  in
  the
  name
  of
  green
  and
  climate
  ‘transitions’,
  which
  in
  turn
  create
  new
  land-based
  politics
  across
  the
  world.

• Third,
  many
  chapters
  argue
  for
  going
  beyond
  a
  narrow,
  individualised
  approach
  to
  land
  rights,
  tenure
  security
  and
  land
  governance.
  This
  managerial,
  administrative
  and
  technocratic
  frame
  dominates
  policy
  thinking
  but
  is
  incompatible
  with
  the
  realities
  on
  the
  ground.
  As
  the
  introduction
  points
  out,
  such
  efforts
  to
  provide
  ‘security’
  for
  women,
  Indigenous
  peoples
  and
  others
  can
  paradoxically
  lead
  to
  opportunities
  for
  dispossession,
  as
  speculation,
  appropriation
  and
  extraction
  increase
  in
  areas
  where
  ‘regularisation’
  has
  generated
  legibility
  through
  demarcation
  and
  delimitation.
  Instead,
  there
  is
  a
  need
  to
  think
  about
  land
  as
  constituted
  through
  hybrid,
  mosaic
  forms
  of
  property
  relation,
  with
  property-making
  as
  a
  continuous,
  contested
  and
  negotiated
  process.
  Land
  is
  always
  embedded
  in
  power
  relations
  and
  so
  thinking
  about
  how
  authority
  over
  land
  is
  generated
  –
  through
  interactions
  between
  citizens,
  states,
  corporations
  and
  other
  actors
  –
  can
  help
  us
  elaborate
  more
  appropriate
  democratic
  institutions
  for
  land
  control
  and
  a
  more
  innovative,
  grounded
  approach
  to
  ‘land
  governance’.

• Finally,
  the
  Handbook
  points
  to
  the
  importance
  of
  understanding
  land
  as
  a
  ‘regime’,
  situated
  in
  a
  wider
  historical
  political
  economy
  context.
  As
  the
  introduction
  highlights,
  a
  land
  regime
  –
  just
  as
  a
  food
  regime
  –
  is
  stabilised,
  perhaps
  only
  tentatively
  and
  temporarily,
  by
  a
  set
  of
  political-economic
  forces
  that
  operate
  within
  a
  particular
  phase
  of
  capitalism.
  But
  regimes
  change
  due
  to
  the
  intersection
  of
  local
  struggles
  and
  wider
  political
  forces
  and
  interests.
  Today
  these
  are
  influenced
  by
  new
  frontiers
  of
  extraction
  and
  accumulation,
  linked
  to
  globalised
  economic
  relations,
  changing
  food
  systems
  and
  heightening
  climate-environment
  imperatives.
  Meanwhile,
  authoritarian,
  populist
  regimes
  define
  the
  nation
  in
  terms
  of
  the
  relationship
  between
  ‘the
  people’
  and
  their
  mother/fatherland,
  always
  in
  ways
  that
  act
  to
  exclude
  some,
  while
  incorporating
  others
  in
  a
  populist
  politics
  of
  land
  and
  belonging.
  Until
  we
  understand
  this
  wider
  historically
  situated,
  structural
  context,
  the
  attempts
  to
  address
  the
  pressing
  challenges
  of
  land
  and
  its
  use
  at
  more
  local
  levels
  –
  whether
  through
  moves
  to
  agroecology
  or
  food
  sovereignty,
  for
  example
  –
  will
  remain
  elusive.

A
great
new
under
2
minute
video
animating
the
one
of
Filipino
artist-activist
Boy
Dominguez’s
now
world-famous
paintings
illustrates
the
themes
well.

The
Handbook
is
a
rich,
diverse
and
deeply
informed
collection,
mixing
theoretical
perspectives
and
grounded
reflections.
By
going
beyond
a
narrow
Marxist
canon
to
encompass
a
wide
array
of
perspectives,
no
particular
line
is
taken.
The
introduction
encourages
readers
to
find
their
own
way,
to
read
across
conceptual
framings
and
reflect
on
different
dimensions
–
in
other
words
to
generate
a
critical
sensibility
to
agrarian
studies
and
land
politics.

For
any
student
of
land,
or
indeed
politics
more
generally,
as
well
as
activists
and
practitioners
grappling
with
the
challenges
of
land
politics,
this
Handbook
is
an
enormously
valuable
and
vital
resource.
These
themes
will
be
central
to
the
discussions
kicking
off
tomorrow
at
the Land,
Life
and
Society
conference
in
Cape
Town.
The
Handbook
will
be
a
great
resource
for
any
attendee
and
many
more.
Get
your
libraries
to
buy
a
copy!

Links:

The Handbook (30%
discount, https://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/authors/promotion/9780197618646-discount.pdf)

The
Introduction (Borras
and
Franco
–
open
access)

The
full Foreword (Scoones
–
open
access)

Post
published
in:

Agriculture

According
to
Prof
Moyo,
this
precedent
means
Zanu
PF
can
lawfully
amend
section
95(2)(b)
of
the
Constitution
by
changing
the
president’s
‘term
length’
from
five
to
seven
years,
extending
it,
for
example,
through
a
two-thirds
parliamentary
majority
so
President
Mnangagwa
can
reach
their “Vision
2030”
agenda.

Prof
Moyo
on
his
X
page
argued that
the
“term‑limit”
clause
(Section 91 (2))
limits
the
number
of
terms
a
person
may
serve,
not
the
duration
of
each
term
and
adjusting
the
duration
(Section 95 (2)(b))
can
be
done
by
a
two‑thirds
parliamentary
majority
(Section 328 (5)).

Moyo’s
main
argument
rests
on
the
difference
between
“term
limits”
and
“term
lengths.”
He
noted
that
criticism
from
opposition
politicians
such
as
David Coltart
on
term
limits
is
mistaken
because
they
mix
up
two
different
parts
of
the
constitution.

Quoting
sections
328
(6),(7),
(8)
and
(9)
of
the
constitution
on his
X
page,
Coltart
had
written 
extending
the
president’s
term
would
require
two
national
referendums,
as
the
constitution
clause
on
term
limits
caps
how
long
a
person
can
stay
in
office,
so
any
extension
must
be
voted
for
by
people
in
a
referendum

“The
term
limit
provisions
are
specially
protected
as
are
provisions
in
Chapter
4
(fundamental
rights)
and
16
(land
provisions).
The
wording
of
328(7)
is
critical
–
“the
effect
of
which
is
to
extend”
makes
it
clear
that
even
if
another
term
isn’t
sought
(that
is,
just
an
extension
of
a
few
years)
any
such
constitutional
amendment
must
go
beyond
a
mere
two
thirds
majority
and
must
have
two
referenda
where
it
involves
an
incumbent,”
Coltart
said.

“It
is
simply
disingenuous
for
anyone
to
suggest
that
the
Zanu
PF
resolution
in
Bulawayo
last
year
calling
for
an
extension
of
President
Mnangagwa’s
term,
or
a
further
term
of
office,
can
lawfully
circumvent
the
two
referenda
provision.”

However,
Prof
Moyo
said
Coltart
had
confused
the
two,
explaining
that
a
term
limit
restricts
how
many
times
a
person
can
hold
office,
currently
two
terms
for
a
president,
while
a
term
length
simply
defines
how
long
each
term
lasts,
such
as
five
years.

Prof
Moyo
pointed
to
the
2021
Constitutional
Court
decision
in
Marx Mupungu
versus
 Minister
of
Justice
as
the
key
precedent,
where
it
ruled
term‑limit
provisions
fixed
caps
on
how
many
terms
an
individual
may
hold
a
post,
that
is
a
president
may
serve
only
two
terms
and
that
requires
a
referendum
to
change
but
the
length
of
a
single
term
for
an
office,
that
is
a
five‑year
presidential
term
can
be
altered
by
Parliament
alone.

“Applied
to
section
95(2)(b),
the
five-year
presidential
term
of
office
is
inherently
variable:
It
‘extends
until’
events
like
resignation,
removal,
or
parliamentary
dissolution,
mirroring
the
contingent
logic
in
the
Mupungu
case.
This
provision
outlines
the
office’s
maximum
framework
(which
is
five
years);
it
is
not
a
personal
cap
on
the
President
as
a
‘public
officer,’”
said
Prof
Moyo.

“The
Constitution’s
sole
presidential
term
limit
on
the
officeholder
lies
in
section
91(2)’s
two-term
bar,
which
would
remain
untouched
by
a
term
length
amendment
to
section
95(2)(b).”

Because
Zanu
PF’s
October 2024
“Resolution Number 1”
concluded
in
its
congress
in
Bulawayo
seeks
to
amend
section 95 (2)(b)
– 
the
clause
that
sets
the
presidential
term
at
five
years,
Prof
Moyo
claimed
the
move
is
fully
permissible
under
the
constitution.

Prof
Moyo
said
Parliament
could
simply
pass
a
bill
with
a
two‑thirds
majority
in
both
houses,
extending
the
term
to,
say,
seven
years,
and
the
president
could
stay
in
office
until
2030.
No
referendum
would
be
needed.

“Amending
Section
95(2)(b)
to
seven
years,
for
instance,
would
simply
recalibrate
this
flexible
duration,
enabling
the
extension
to
2030
via
a
two-thirds
vote
in
each
House
in
Parliament
-free
from
the
“dictates”
of
Sections
328(6)–
(9),”
he
said.

Prof
Moyo
said
several
countries,
such
as
Guinea
and
Ireland,
already
have
seven-year
presidential
terms
without
violating
democratic
principles,
suggesting
Zimbabwe
could
follow
suit.

“If
a
president
resigns
after
two
years,
his
or
her
successor
serves
only
the
remaining
three,
not
a
full
five.
This
underlines
the
office’s
contingent
nature.
The
true
‘term
of
officer’
limit
appears
solely
in
Section
91(2),
which
caps
re-eligibility
of
incumbents
at
two
terms
(with
three
or
more
years
counting
as
a
full
term)
but
imposes
no
upper
ceiling
on
term
duration
-allowing
for
four,
five,
seven,
or
more
years
as
may
be
rationally
and
democratically
justifiable,”
he
said.

“Recent
examples
abound:
Guinea
just
adopted
a
seven-year
presidential
term
on
21
September
2025,
while
Ireland
has
for
decades
maintained
a
seven-year
presidential
term
capped
at
two
terms.”

Political
analyst,
Mxolisi
Ncube,
said
these
were
signs
of
creeping
authoritarianism,
where
the
ruling
party
is
testing
constitutional
loopholes
to
prolong
its
stay
in
power
and
called
for
vigilance

“The
practical
impact
of
this
is
if
Zanu
PF’s
resolution
passes,
President
Mnangagwa
could
remain
in
office
longer
without
a
public
vote,
provided
the
two‑term
limit
is
not
breached.
Any
amendment
extending
Mnangagwa’s
current
term
should
be
subject
to
broad
public
consultation,”
he
said.

Meanwhile,
a
comparative
constitutional
and
international
law
scholar
Dr
Justice
Mavedzenge
outlined
another
potential
political
manoeuvre
where
President
Mnangagwa
could
resign
before
completing
three
years
of
his
current
term,
triggering
the
provisions
of
Sections
100
and
101
of
the
Constitution,
which
allow
a
vice
president
to
act
as
president
until
Zanu
PF
nominates
a
replacement
to
complete
the
term.

He
said
this
constitutional
loophole
can
extend
President
Mnangagwa’s
stay
in
power
beyond
2028
without
formally
amending
the
Constitution.

Speaking
during
one
of
CITE’s
This
Morning
Asakhe
X
Space
discussion
titled
“Vision
2030
or
Power
Extension:
Decoding
Zanu
PF
Endorsements,”
Dr
Mavedzenge
said
certain
provisions
in
Zimbabwe’s
Constitution
could
be
strategically
interpreted
to
allow
President
Mnangagwa
to
remain
politically
relevant
up
to
2030.

“A
constitution
is
only
powerful
to
the
extent
that
its
owners,
the
citizens,
know
about
it,”
said
Dr
Mavedzenge.

“I
wrote
about
this
issue
on
my
blog,
trying
to
unpack
what
Zanu
PF
Harare
provincial
chairperson
(Godwills
Masimirembwa)
meant
when
he
said
Zanu
PF
will
achieve
Vision
2030
without
a
national
referendum.
I
grappled
with
that
because
I
wanted
to
find
out
what
it
is.
Is
he
just
mad
or
is
he
on
to
something?
And
I
found
something.”

Dr
Mavedzenge
said
the
key
lies
in
Sections
91,
100
and
101
of
the
Constitution,
which
together
define
how
presidential
terms
are
measured
and
what
happens
when
a
president
leaves
office.

“The
Constitution
says
that
a
full
term
for
the
president
is
anything
from
three
years
and
above.
If
a
president
serves
less
than
three
years,
that
period
is
not
considered
a
full
term,”
he
explained.
“If
President
Mnangagwa
were
to
serve
only
up
to
around
September
2026,
that
would
not
count
as
a
full
term,
making
him
constitutionally
eligible
to
contest
again.”

Dr
Mavedzenge
said
if
the
president
were
to
resign
before
completing
three
years
of
his
current
term,
triggering
the
provisions
of
Sections
100
and
101,
that
allows
a
vice
president
to
act
as
president
until
Zanu
PF
nominates
a
replacement
to
complete
the
term.

“I
imagine
what
the
party
could
potentially
do
is
engage
Section
101
and
100,
allowing
one
of
the
vice
presidents
to
act
as
president
while
the
party
nominates
a
substantive
replacement
to
serve
out
the
remainder,”
he
said.
“When
I
first
wrote
this,
it
sounded
crazy,
and
my
colleagues
said
it
was
risky
and
impossible.
But
the
more
I
look
at
what
is
happening
in
Zanu
PF
today,
the
more
I
feel
I
might
be
correct.”

He
said
recent
political
developments,
including
speculation
about
a
reconfiguration
of
the
vice
presidency,
suggest
possible
preparations
for
such
a
scenario.

“When
you
look
at
this
idea
of
trying
to
reconstitute
the
presidency,
bringing
in
figures
like
(businessman
Kuda)
Tagwirei
as
potential
vice
presidents
and
the
pushback
against
Vice
President
Constantino
Chiwenga,
I
get
the
sense
that
what
the
2030
campaigners
are
doing
is
to
also
try
and
reconfigure
the
office
of
the
vice
president,”
he
noted.

Dr
Mavedzenge
added
this
could
make
it
possible
for
President
Mnangagwa
to
temporarily
leave
office
between
September
2026
and
return
in
2028
ahead
of
the
next
election,
with
a
temporary
placeholder
in
between.

“In
order
to
make
it
a
possibility
that
President
Mnangagwa
can
have
the
option
of
temporarily
leaving
the
office
between
September
2026
and
coming
back
in
September
2028
when
the
next
elections
are
due
and
Zanu
PF
will
have
a
temporary
placeholder.”

Dr
Mavedzenge
acknowledged
that
such
a
move
would
be
politically
risky,
as
power
vacuums
often
shift
loyalties
but
said
it
was
still
a
scenario
worth
considering
seriously.

Of
course,
we
have
to
accept
that
that
is
risky
because
in
politics,
loyalties
shift.
But
I
want
us
to
think
about
that
as
well
as
a
possibility.
I’m
not
saying
and
I’m
still
not
even
myself
convinced
that
is
a
viable
way
of
achieving
2030. 
But
it
is
important,
I
emphasize
to
think
about
that
and
also
say
if
we
are
going
to
work
to
defend
our
constitution.”

He
further
warned
Zimbabwe’s
constitutional
protections
remain
vulnerable
because
the
institutions
meant
to
uphold
them,
the
judiciary,
civil
society
and
opposition,
are
weak
or
compromised.

“A
good
constitutional
text
such
as
what
we
have
must
be
supported
by
an
independent
judiciary,
which
I
think
there
are
doubts
about
the
independence
of
the
Zimbabwean
judiciary,
especially
when
it
comes
to
deciding
on
politically
sensitive
cases.
The
second
is
that
a
good
constitution
such
as
ours
needs
to
be
supported
by
a
strong
civil
society.
And
I
think
our
civil
society
at
the
moment
is
quite
in
a
very
difficult
situation,”
he
said.

“Civic
space
or
democratic
space
has
been
closed,
but
also
inadequate
resources.
But
also,
I
think
there
have
been
attempts
to
capture
civil
society
itself.
So
we
currently
have
a
very
weak
civil
society.
You
also
have
to
have
a
very
strong
opposition…But
the
fact
is
we
don’t
have
a
strong
opposition.

Dr
Mavedzenge
urged
citizens
to
focus
not
only
on
political
outcomes
but
on
the
“infrastructure
of
democracy”
that
sustains
constitutionalism.

“Without
the
infrastructure
of
a
strong
opposition,
a
strong
civil
society,
independent
courts,
the
constitution
is
meaningless.
So
we
have
to
pay
attention
to
the
infrastructure.
Democracy
is
a
good
thing,
but
democracy
only
works
if
the
infrastructure
to
defend
it
is
in
place,”
he
said.

The
accused,
Likhwa
Nyathi
(26),
Simangele
Singa
(40),
Definite
Munsaka
(34),
Chetai
Mathe
(35)
and
Lynette
Zulu
(34),
appeared
before
Magistrate
Matove.
The
State
was
represented
by
prosecutor
J.
Makanza,
while
the
villagers
were
represented
by
lawyer
Thulani
Nkala
of
Dube
and
Nkala
Legal
Practitioners.

Nkala
confirmed
that
the
five
are
expected
to
return
to
court
on
17
October
2025
for
remand.

The
villagers
face
charges
of
contravening
Section
118(1)(a)
of
the
Water
Act
(Chapter
20:24)
and
Section
41(b)
of
the
Criminal
Law
(Codification
and
Reform)
Act
(Chapter
9:23),
which
relate
to
disorderly
conduct.
Zulu
faces
an
additional
charge
under
Section
77(1)(9)
of
the
same
Act.

According
to
the
State,
the
incident
occurred
on
1
October
2025
at
Kalope
Dam,
where
the
accused
allegedly
obstructed
ZhongJin
Heli
Energy
(Private)
Limited,
represented
by
Silvester
Munkuli,
from
laying
water
pipes
meant
to
draw
water
from
the
dam
as
authorised
by
the
Zimbabwe
National
Water
Authority
(ZINWA).

“On
the
1st
day
of
October
2025
at
around
700
hours,
Silvester
Munkuli
together
with
his
co-workers
and
supervisors
were
working
on
laying
water
pipes
to
draw
water
from
Kalope
Dam
when
the
accused
Nyathi
and
Singa
proceeded
to
Kalope
Dam
and
started
telling
the
ZhongJin
workers
to
stop
laying
water
pipes
or
else
they
would
stone
them,”
said
Makanza.

“Police
officers
comprising
of
Assistant
Inspector
Mhini
and
Theresa
Humanikwa
proceeded
to
the
scene
where
they
apprehended
Nyathi
and
Singa,”
he
added.

Makanza
told
the
court
that
once
the
other
villagers
heard
of
the
arrests,
“Munsaka,
Chetani
and
Zulu
proceeded
to
Kalope
Dam
where
they
threatened
to
call
other
villagers
so
that
they
stone
ZhongJin
Heli.”

He
said
the
complainant
then
informed
the
police,
who
revisited
the
scene
and
found
that
the
workers
had
stopped
laying
the
PVC
water
pipes
connecting
Kalope
Dam
to
the
company.

“The
police
officers
ordered
the
workers
to
resume
working
and
during
the
time,
Nyathi,
Singa
and
Zulu
jumped
into
the
trench
and
removed
laid
PVC
pipes
out
of
the
trench
and
went
on
to
block
the
excavator
pathway
along
the
mainline
trench
in
order
to
stop
excavation
in
the
trench.
The
excavator
operator
subsequently
stopped
working
as
a
result,”
said
Makanza.

In
a
second
count,
the
State
alleges
that
the
accused
engaged
in
riotous
conduct
by
threatening
to
stone
police
officers
at
the
scene,
allegedly
shouting
in
Shona, “tokutemayi
nematombo,” which
translates
to “we
will
strike
you
with
stones.”

“Thereby
incited
other
villagers
in
obstructing
ZhongJin
Heli
Energy
(Private)
Limited
from
connecting
the
water
pipes.
The
accused
persons
were
subsequently
arrested.
Accused
persons
acted
unlawfully,”
said
Makanza.

On
a
third
count,
Zulu
is
accused
of
indecent
exposure
after
she
allegedly
“removed
her
dress
and
exposed
her
breasts
in
full
view
of
others
at
Kalope
Dam.”

HARARE
–
Four
armed
robbery
suspects
were
shot
dead
in
a
fierce
exchange
of
gunfire
with
police
detectives
near
Norton
on
Friday,
the
Zimbabwe
Republic
Police
(ZRP)
said
on
Sunday.

Two
detectives
from
the
Criminal
Investigations
Department
(CID)
Homicide
section
were
seriously
injured
and
are
receiving
treatment
at
a
local
hospital.

Police
spokesperson
Commissioner
Paul
Nyathi
said
two
of
the
slain
suspects
were
foreign
nationals.

“The
Zimbabwe
Republic
Police
confirms
a
serious
shooting
incident
and
exchange
of
fire
by
CID
Homicide
detectives
and
armed
robbery
suspects
in
Norton
on
3
October
2025.
Four
suspects
have
died
while
two
detectives
sustained
serious
injuries,”
Nyathi
said.

He
said
detectives
had
been
tracking
a
motorised
syndicate
that
had
crossed
from
South
Africa
to
carry
out
robberies
in
Bulawayo,
Harare
and
Kwekwe.

“As
the
detectives
were
following,
the
suspects
fired
at
them,
resulting
in
a
serious
exchange
of
fire
near
the
Norton
Tollgate
along
the
Harare–Bulawayo
Road,”
Nyathi
said.

Police
recovered
the
suspects’
getaway
car
—
a
Toyota
Axio
—
along
with
two
pistols:
a
Girsan
9mm
Parabellum
loaded
with
two
rounds,
and
another
9mm
Parabellum
with
one
round
remaining.
Also
recovered
were
a
pair
of
Relay
grey
and
army-green
shoes
and
a
black-and-navy-blue
jacket
branded
“Grey
Wolf.”

Nyathi
said
one
of
the
slain
suspects
had
been
captured
on
CCTV
wearing
the
same
shoes
and
jacket
during
a
September
30
armed
robbery
at
a
Harare
hospital,
where
robbers
stole
US$1,833
in
cash
and
airtime
recharge
cards
worth
US$140.

The
gang
is
linked
to
five
armed
robbery
cases
committed
between
June
25
and
October
3,
2025,
in
Harare
and
Bulawayo,
including
a
June
25
robbery
in
Njube,
where
US$8,000
and
an
iPhone
were
stolen.

“The
Zimbabwe
Republic
Police
reiterates
that
there
is
no
going
back
in
the
fight
against
armed
robbery
cases
in
the
country.
All
syndicates,
whether
locally
or
foreign-based,
will
be
decisively
dealt
with
in
line
with
the
country’s
laws,”
Nyathi
said.

Police
urged
members
of
the
public
to
report
criminal
activities
to
the
National
Complaints
Desk
on
(0242)
703631,
via
WhatsApp
on
0712
800
197,
or
at
any
nearest
police
station.

The
measures,
presented
during
a
full
council
meeting,
cover
mining
operations,
construction
materials,
non-timber
forest
produce,
and
new
revenue
streams
such
as
carbon
credits.

Council
treasurer
Sicelesile
Ncube
said
the
local
authority
was
responding
to
rising
commercial
activity
in
the
district.

“We
saw
that
in
Gwanda
there
is
quarry.
We
realised
that
there
will
be
people
interested
in
having
businesses
dealing
with
quarry,
so
we
introduced
the
licences
at
US$500
per
annum,”
she
said.

Penalties
for
illegal
sand
extraction
will
also
increase
from
US$100
to
US$300,
in
line
with
existing
by-laws.

“We
have
aligned
it
with
our
by-law
which
is
at
US$300,
so
we
increased
it
for
2026,”
Ncube
explained.

The
mining
sector
will
see
significant
changes.
Fees
for
stamp
mills,
which
were
reduced
to
US$2,400
in
2025,
will
revert
to
US$3,000
per
year
after
a
review
revealed
that
some
operators
were
carrying
out
multiple
activities
under
a
single
licence.

“Stamp
mills
were
US$2,400
for
2025,
but
initially
they
were
US$3,000,”
said
Ncube.
“We
had
a
tour
as
the
Finance
Committee
visited
areas
with
stamp
mills
and
we
realised
that
people
with
stamp
mills
will
be
calling
it
a
stamp
mill,
but
when
you
enter
inside
the
mine
you
realise
there
are
many
activities
happening.
So
we
decided
to
bring
it
back
to
US$3,000,
which
we
were
initially
charging.”

Ball
mills
and
hammer
mills,
previously
charged
the
same,
will
now
be
separated,
ball
mills
at
US$700
and
hammer
mills
at
US$600.

“We
used
to
charge
these
the
same
at
US$600,
but
we
were
advised
that
they
are
different.
We
left
the
hammer
mill
at
US$600
and
the
ball
mill
is
at
US$700
because
they
work
differently,
so
we
separated
the
prices,”
Ncube
said.

At
the
processing
level,
fees
for
elution
plants
have
been
reduced
from
US$2,400
to
US$2,000,
while
heap
leach
plants
will
rise
from
US$3,000
to
US$3,500.
Fees
for
cyanidation
tanks
remain
unchanged.

The
council
has
also
introduced
a
charge
on
soil
aggregates
used
in
commercial
building
projects,
pegged
at
US$3
per
tonne.

“On
permits
for
soil
aggregate,
we
noticed
that
in
rural
areas,
people
are
now
building
huge
houses,
so
we
said
we
will
charge
them
US$3
per
tonne,”
Ncube
said.

“We
are
specifically
targeting
those
building
shops.
Some
of
them
are
consuming
too
much
of
our
soil.
We
are
looking
at
ways
to
increase
our
revenue
bases,
so
we
are
targeting
those
building
businesses,
not
homes.”

GRDC
also
plans
to
regulate
the
commercial
harvesting
of
non-timber
forest
produce,
particularly
mopane
worms
(amacimbi).

“On
non-timber
produce
we
are
looking
at
things
like
amacimbi.
There
will
be
those
whom
we
will
charge
US$150,
we
are
targeting
those
coming
with
vehicles
to
buy
and
hoard
many
bags,”
Ncube
said.

“Then
there
are
those
who
harvest
mopane
worms
from
home,
we
are
going
to
charge
them
US$50.
The
US$50
is
not
for
those
staying
here
and
harvesting
for
consumption
purposes,
it’s
for
those
doing
commercial
purposes.”

She
added:

“But
if
the
villagers
also
harvest
for
commercial
purposes,
we
will
also
expect
them
to
pay
the
US$50
permit.”

Ncube
said
the
council
was
also
exploring
revenue
from
carbon
credits,
projecting
about
US$150,000
in
the
2026
budget
framework.

“We
are
not
yet
sure
how
that
will
be
charged,”
she
added.

Carbon
credits
are permits
that
allow
the
owner
of
the
credit
to
emit
a
certain
amount
of
carbon
dioxide
or
other
greenhouse
gases
(GHGs).
One
credit allows
the
emission
of
one
ton
of
carbon
dioxide
or
the
equivalent
of
other
greenhouse
gases.