On
the
16th
February
the
long-threatened
Bill
to
amend
the
Constitution
and
extend
the
President’s
term
of
office
was
published
in
a
Gazette
Extraordinary. The
Bill
can
be
accessed
on
the
Veritas
website [link]. Apart
from
extending
the
presidential
term,
the
Bill
will
do
several
other
things: it
proposes
that
the
President
should
be
elected
by
Parliament
rather
than
by
voters
in
a
general
election,
for
instance; it
will
also
strip
the
Zimbabwe
Electoral
Commission
[ZEC]
of
its
responsibility
for
registering
voters
and
delimiting
electoral
boundaries; and
it
will
give
the
President
power
to
appoint
ten
Senators.
In
this
bulletin
and
the
succeeding
one
we
shall
examine
the
Bill
in
detail
and
comment
on
the
amendments
it
proposes
to
make
to
the
Constitution.
Election
of
the
President
and
Extension
of
the
Presidential
Term
The
most
controversial
provisions
of
the
Bill
are
contained
in
clauses
3
and
4. Clause
3
will
provide
for
the
President
to
be
elected
by
Parliament,
not
by
voters
in
a
general
election,
and
clause
4
will
extend
the
presidential
and
parliamentary
terms
from
five
to
seven
years.
Election
of
the
President
Under
clause
3 the
President
will
be
elected
by
Members
of
Parliament
–
Senators
and
members
of
the
National
Assembly
sitting
together
–
after
each
general
election. ZEC
or
a
“designated
judge”
will
preside
over
the
presidential
election,
which
will
be
conducted
in
accordance
with
Parliament’s
standing
orders. Until
this
election
has
taken
place,
the
previous
President
will
remain
in
office.
Parliament
will
be
forbidden
to
pass
amendments
to
any
laws
“introducing
substantive
policy
changes”
while
there
is
a
vacancy
in
the
office
of
President.
Comment: It
is
not
necessarily
a
bad
thing
for
the
President
to
be
elected
by
Parliament
rather
than
by
the
general
body
of
voters
–
the
South
African
President
is
elected
in
this
way,
for
example. It
means,
at
least
in
theory,
that
the
President
will
derive
his
power
from
Parliament
and
will
not
have
an
independent
mandate
from
the
people.
In
the
immediate
Zimbabwean
context,
however,
the
amendment
probably
reflects
the
stated
objective
of
the
ruling
party
to
extend
the
current
Presidents
term.
That
is
not
a
worthy
or
adequate
reason
for
changing
the
way
Presidents
are
elected.
We
should
add
that
the
clause
is
carelessly
put
together. There
is
no
indication,
for
example,
of
who
will
designate
a
judge
to
preside
over
presidential
elections
in
Parliament.
Extension
of
the
presidential
term
Clause
4 of
the
Bill
will
extend
presidential
terms
of
office
from
five
years
to
seven
years.
It
also
contains
a
provision
to
make
the
extension
apply
to
the
current
President’s
term
of
office,
so
that
his
term
will
end
in
2030
rather
than
in
2028.
According
to
the
provision,
the
extension
will
apply
to
him
despite
section
328(7)
of
the
Constitution,
which
states
that
a
constitutional
amendment
extending
the
length
of
time
that
a
person
is
allowed
to
hold
an
office
(a
term-limit)
cannot
apply
to
anyone
who
has
held
or
is
currently
holding
the
office.
Comments:
There
are
problems
with
trying
to
extend
the
current
President’s
term
of
office.
As
we
have
said,
section
328(7)
of
the
Constitution
states
that
an
extension
to
a
term-limit
(which
in
the
President’s
case
is
two
five-year
terms)
cannot
apply
to
the
current
office-holder.
If
the
current
President
is
to
be
allowed
to
serve
an
extra
two
years,
it
will
entail
amending
or
overriding
section
328(7)
but
this
cannot
be
done
except
through
a
Bill
which,
after
being
passed
by
Parliament,
has
been
approved
by
a
majority
of
voters
in
a
national
referendum
(see
subsections
(6)
and
(9)
of
section
328).
Hence,
before
clause
4
of
this
Bill
becomes
law,
it
must
be
put
to
a
referendum
and
approved
by
the
voters.
It
has
been
suggested
that
the
Bill
will
merely
elongate
the
electoral
cycle,
but
this
ignores
the
fact
that
the
Bill
will
lengthen
the
period
the
current
President
may
remain
in
office:
in
other
words,
it
will
extend
his
term.
If
it
does
that,
it
will
override
section
328(7)
–
i.e.
it
will
amend
the
section
–
and
so
have
to
be
put
to
a
referendum.
As
to
the
intrinsic
merits
of
the
proposal,
it
must
be
conceded
that
there
is
nothing
magical
about
five-year
terms
for
presidents
and
legislatures. In
the
United
States
presidents
and
members
of
Congress
serve
four-year
terms,
and
in
Britain
parliamentary
terms
have
varied
over
the
centuries
from
three
to
seven
years. In
France
presidential
terms
used
to
be
seven
years
but
were
reduced
to
five
years
in
2002. However,
seven-year
terms
for
executive
presidents
are
rare
nowadays,
for
sound
democratic
reasons,
and
tend
to
be
associated
with
authoritarian
régimes.
Furthermore,
experience
has
shown
that
persons
in
government
become
more
complacent
the
longer
they
remain
in
office,
so
their
efficiency
decreases
and
corruption
tends
to
increase.
In
this
country,
the
proposed
amendment
runs
counter
to
a
founding
value
of
our
Constitution,
namely
good
governance. Section
3(2)(b)(ii)
of
the
Constitution
states
that
free,
fair
and
regular
elections
are
a
principle
of
good
governance,
and
section
67
goes
on
to
make
regular
elections
the
right
of
every
Zimbabwean
citizen. This
principle
and
this
right
will
be
rendered
nugatory
if
the
President
and
Members
of
Parliament
are
allowed
to
extend
their
terms
of
office
merely
to
suit
the
internal
dynamics
of
the
ruling
party,
without
putting
the
extension
to
a
referendum
and
getting
it
approved
by
a
majority
of
the
electorate.
The
justification
put
forward
for
the
extension
is
unconvincing.
According
to
the
memorandum
attached
to
the
Bill,
extending
the
President’s
term
will
“eliminate
election
mode
toxicity
and
allow
sufficient
time
for
project
implementation”. The
toxicity
of
elections
has
nothing
to
do
with
their
frequency.
If
a
government
fails
to
carry
out
its
projects
in
five
years
it
should
go
back
to
the
voters
and
justify
its
failure,
so
that
the
voters
can
either
renew
its
mandate
or
give
another
party
a
chance
to
do
better.
Vice-Presidents
and
Presidential
Succession
At
present
there
are
two
Vice-Presidents
appointed
by
the
President
(section
94(2a)
of
the
Constitution,
as
amended
in
2021); one
of
them
is
designated
as
the
first
Vice-President
who
acts
for
the
President
whenever
the
President
himself
is
absent. If
the
President
dies
or
ceases
to
hold
office,
the
first
Vice-President
acts
until
a
new
President
is
nominated
by
the
former
President’s
party
(section
101
of
the
Constitution).
Clauses
5
and
6
of
the
Bill
propose
to
change
this
so
that
“the
Vice-President”
will
take
over
when
the
President
is
absent
or
unable
to
exercise
his
or
her
functions
until
the
President
returns
or,
in
the
event
of
the
President’s
death
or
removal
from
office,
until
Parliament
elects
a
new
President.
Comment: The
amendment
is
confused,
in
that
it
does
not
specify
which
Vice-President
should
take
over
if
there
are
two
of
them. It
would
be
better
if
the
amendment
were
to
reduce
the
number
of
Vice-Presidents
to
one,
though
that
might
make
it
difficult
to
maintain
regional
balance
in
the
topmost
tiers
of
government.
Extension
of
the
Life
of
Parliament
Clause
9
of
the
Bill
proposes
to
extend
the
life
of
Parliament
–
i.e.
to
lengthen
the
intervals
between
general
elections
–
from
five
to
seven
years,
in
tandem
with
the
new
presidential
term. The
clause
also
tries
to
apply
this
extension
to
the
current
Parliament
so
that
the
next
general
election
will
be
held
in
2030
rather
than
2028.
Comments: What
we
have
said
about
extending
the
term
of
the
President
applies
equally
to
the
attempt
to
extend
the
life
of
the
current
Parliament,
because
it
necessarily
entails
extending
the
tenure
of
the
current
parliamentarians
–
i.e.
it
will
extend
the
time
that
they
remain
in
office.
So
if
it
is
to
be
done
at
all,
the
Bill
will
have
to
be
approved
by
voters
at
a
referendum.
The
clause,
incidentally,
is
badly
drafted. It
purports
to
extend
“the
office
of
the
Senate
and
the
National
Assembly”,
which
is
nonsense. There
is
no
such
office.
Composition
of
the
Senate
Clause
8
of
the
Bill
will
give
the
President
power
to
appoint
ten
Senators
“chosen
for
their
professional
skills
and
other
competencies”.
Comments: Good
governance
is
a
founding
value
of
the
Constitution,
as
we
noted
earlier,
and
one
of
the
principles
of
good
governance
is
the
separation
of
powers
(see
section
3(2)(e)
of
the
Constitution). The
principle
of
separation
of
powers
will
be
violated
if
the
President,
who
heads
the
Executive
branch
of
government,
is
given
power
to
appoint
Senators,
who
are
members
of
the
Legislative
branch.
Under
the
Lancaster
House
constitution
as
amended
in
2007,
President
Mugabe
was
given
power
to
appoint
five
Senators,
and
he
always
appointed
loyal
party
members
–
which
was
often
their
only
apparent
qualification. It
would
be
naïve
to
assume
that
the
current
and
future
Presidents
will
be
any
more
selective
in
their
appointments.
It
may
or
may
not
be
significant,
but
the
proposed
amendment
will
indirectly
allow
the
President
to
appoint
more
unelected
Cabinet
Ministers. Under
section
104
of
the
Constitution,
the
President
is
entitled
to
appoint
up
to
seven
Ministers
from
outside
Parliament. If
the
amendment
is
passed
he
could
get
round
this
limit
by
appointing
prospective
Ministers
as
Senators
and
then
appointing
them
to
the
Cabinet. In
this
way
he
could
pack
the
Cabinet
with
unelected
Ministers
who
are
loyal
to
him
personally.
Our
analysis
of
the
Bill
will
continue
in
the
next
Constitution
Watch.
Veritas
makes
every
effort
to
ensure
reliable
information,
but
cannot
take
legal
responsibility
for
information
supplied
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